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Challenging Judicial Presumptions when Equity is not Equality 
By Georgina Andrews and Simon Parsons * 
This paper discusses the abolition of the presumption of advancement within England and 
Wales by the Equality Act 2010 and the impact of BREXIT on this, and other debates 
relating to European legislation. The authors consider whether the presumption 
constitutes a ‘right’, a ‘responsibility’, or a rule of evidence. The paper explores the 
controversy surrounding the abolition of the equitable presumption, and the way the 
presumption has evolved in Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore. The effects of enactment 
of the legislation are anticipated. The paper also considers what the courts can do to 
make the presumption more equal in its effect prior to abolition. The paper crosses 
traditional subject boundaries by exploring the relationship between Property Law and 
Trusts, Equality and Diversity, Human Rights and European Law.  
The presumption of advancement is an equitable doctrine that rebuts the presumption of 
resulting trust1. Thus, unusually, a transfer of legal title without evidence of intention to 
transfer the equitable interest will in certain circumstances also result in the transfer of 
the equitable interest.  The presumption of advancement discriminates on the grounds of 
gender. A transfer of property from husband to wife2, from a man to his fiancée3, or from 
                                                          
* G Andrews is a Professor at Bath Spa University and S Parsons is a former Associate Professor at 
Southampton Solent University. 
1
Where an individual transfers the legal title of property to another with an absence of evidence of intention 
to pass the beneficial interest in the property, the courts will normally presume that the property is held on 
resulting trust for the transferor. Re Vandervell (No 2) [1974] Ch. 269. Westdeutche Landesbank Girozentrale v 
Islington LBC  [1996] A.C.669. Similarly, if property is purchased in the name of someone other then the person 
who provided the purchase money, Equity presumes that the property is held on resulting trust for the person 
who provided the funds, Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox Eq Cas 92 at 93 per Eyre CB. The presumption also applies 
between a father and his illegitimate child, see Beckford v Beckford (1774) Lofft 490 and Soar v Foster (1858) 4 
K & J 152 at 157, 160. Where property is purchased in the joint names of the person providing the purchase 
money and another, the application of the resulting trust means that the whole of the beneficial interest is 
retained by the person who provided the consideration. Re Vinogradoff, Allen v Jackson [1935] WN 68.  
2
Re Eykyn’s Trusts (1877)6 Ch.D. 115,Tinker v Tinker [1970] 2 W.L.R. 331. 
3
 Moate v Moate [1948] 2 All ER 486. 
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a father to his child4, stepchild 5 or adopted child6 invokes the presumption. However a 
transfer from a wife to her husband7 or from a mother to her child8 does not9.  
The presumption of resulting trust and the presumption of advancement only apply when 
there is no evidence of subjective intention, so that Equity attributes an objective 
intention. With the presumption of advancement Equity considers that A has a moral 
obligation to provide for B. Hence a transfer of property carries equitable ownership as 
well as legal ownership. But the presumption is unequal as if A is B’s mother or wife, 
rather then B’s father or husband, the presumption of advancement does not apply. In 
these circumstances the presumption of resulting trust remains, and equitable ownership 
is not transferred.  
To give an example of the implications: 
If Blackacre is purchased with money of A but transferred by the vendor on completion 
to B a court of equity will presume (if no more is known) that Blackacre is held by B in 
trust for A [a presumption of a resulting trust] ; B is the legal owner, A the beneficial 
owner. If however A is B’s father, the court will presume that the transfer is a gift by A 
to B [a presumption of advancement]. 
In the first example rebuttal of the presumption involves B’s demonstrating that A 
intended to give Blackacre to B. In the second example rebuttal involves A’s 
demonstrating that a gift was not intended. 10  
The discriminatory application of the presumption of advancement has led to judicial 
censor. In the leading case of Pettitt v Pettitt11 Lord Diplock famously  stated that it was 
                                                          
4
Re Roberts [1946] Ch. 1, Mcgrath v Wallis [1995] 2 F.L.R. 114, Shepherd v Cartwright [1995] A.C. 431. 
5
 Re Paradise Motor Co Ltd  [1968] 2 All ER 625. 
6
 Under the Adoption Act 1976 s 39(1) an adopted child is treated as if he / she had been born to the adoptors 
in wedlock. 
7
Mercier v Mercier [1903] 2 Ch. 98, Hestletine v Hestletine [1971] 1 W.L.R. 342. 
8
Bennett v Bennett [1879] 10 Ch.D.474. 
9
Unless the mother is deemed to have put herself in loco parentis to the child. Re Orme[1883] 50 L.T.51.    
10
 Nelson v Nelson (1994) 33 NSWLR 740: (1994) 116 FLR 15, 22.  See Glister J ‘Is There a Presumption of 
Advancement?) Sydney Law Review Vol 33:39 p 60. 
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‘an abuse…… to apply to transactions between the post-war generation of married couples 
‘presumptions’ which were based upon….the most likely intentions of an earlier 
generation of spouses belonging to the propertied classes of a different social era.’  
Lord Diplock alluded in Pettitt to the origins of the presumption, which dated back to 
times when husbands and fathers were deemed responsible to provide for and support 
their wives and children. Wives and mothers did not share this duty. Hence, in the past it 
was entirely logical that the presumption should be invoked only in circumstances where it 
was deemed that the transferor intended to pass the beneficial interest as well as the 
legal title, because the transferor was under an obligation, recognised in Equity, to 
support or provide for the transferee.  However, times changed, as recognised by Lord 
Diplock and others.  
Perhaps recognising this, the judiciary will only apply the presumption (or the presumption 
of resulting trust) when they absolutely have to, preferring to hear evidence to ascertain, 
in the example, A’s subjective intention. The standard of proof is low because even 
minimal evidence will be used to rebut the presumption. The presumption is likely to 
apply where there are no surviving witnesses to a gift and thus it is regarded by the 
judiciary as a final course of action, used only when all else has failed.12 Blackman also 
recently pointed out that the greater role of common intention trusts in resolving disputes 
over equitable interests in family homes limits the role of the presumption of 
advancement in such disputes.13  
In the recent case of NCA v Dong and Fang14 a resulting trust was applied to a transfer of 
property to a ‘brother’, thus allowing the National Crime Agency (NCA) to secure a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11
 [1970] A.C.777 at 824. 
12
 Blackham A ‘The Presumption of Advancement: a Lingering Shadow in UK law’ Trusts & Trustees (2015) 21 
(7) 786 at 789.  
13
 Ibid at 789. 
14 [2017] EWHC 3116 (Ch). 
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charging order on the property. An attendance note of a telephone conversation with the 
transferor, prepared by the solicitor when instructed to draft the transfer, was accepted 
as evidence of the intention to create a trust. This was despite the fact that the transferor 
rejected advice to complete a Trust Deed, and was warned that without this he had no 
means of enforcing the trust. The presumption of advancement does not apply to transfers 
between brothers, and in this case there was in fact no blood relationship between the 
parties anyway. The term ‘brother’ was used to denote the very close Chinese ‘guanxi’ 
relationship that existed between the transferor and the transferee. Hence the transferor 
remained the beneficial owner of the property, and the NCA were granted a charging 
order. 
If the presumption of advancement appeared out of date to Lord Diplock in the 1970’s, it 
was seriously anachronistic in the 21st century. Academics such as Halliwell15, Dowling16  
strongly criticised the continued, albeit weakened17 existence of the presumption of 
advancement. In 2005, Part IV section 16 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Northern Ireland) Order 200518 (the 2005 Order) abolished the presumption of 
advancement in Northern Ireland in relation to married or engaged couples. (Anti –
discrimination matters are devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly.) The abolition was 
based on the view that the presumption conflicts with Article 5, Protocol 7 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights19 (‘the Convention’) (which provides for equality of 
rights and responsibilities of spouses). The Explanatory Memorandum to the 2005 Order 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
15
 Halliwell, J. ‘Equitable Proprietary Claims and Dishonest Claimants: A Resolution.’ (1994) Conv. 274. 
16
 Dowling, A. ‘The Presumption of Advancement between Mother and Child.’ (1996) Conv.274. See also ‘Why 
a Wife’s Gifts are such a Lottery’ Times, July 20 1999; A.Wallace, ‘A Healthy Doctrine’ (2001) Tru & E.L.J.  26, 
16-19; R. Walford, ‘As Good as New’ (2001) Tru & E.L.J. 31, 9-11. 
17
 The presumption of advancement can be rebutted by evidence of a contrary intention and the courts have 
been increasingly willing to find even the slightest evidence of such, for example in McGrath v Wallis [1995] 2 
F.L.R. 114. 
18
 Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/nisi/2005/1452/contents. Accessed 21st January 2017. 
19
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocol No.11 
1998. 
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states that the presumption is ‘outdated and discriminatory and requires repeal in order 
to satisfy the protocol 7.’20  
Rob Marris MP (Wolverhampton South West, Labour) introduced a Private Members Bill 
‘The Family Law (Property and Maintenance) Bill’ in the UK House of Commons in 2005. 
The Bill mirrored the 2005 order in Northern Ireland by providing for the abolition of the 
presumption of advancement in relation to married or engaged couples in England and 
Wales. It was also predicated on the belief that the presumption conflicts with Article 5, 
Protocol 7 and Article 1 Protocol 12 (which contains a general prohibition of 
discrimination).  However, the Bill was dropped due to a lack of parliamentary time. 
A further opportunity to address the inequality occasioned by the presumption of 
advancement arose in February 2010, when the Equality Bill was amended in the House of 
Lords by the introduction of a new Section 199, which abolishes the presumption of 
advancement in its entirety21. The proposed section went further than both the 2005 
Order in Northern Ireland, and Rob Marris’s thwarted Private Members Bill, since both of 
these interventions limited abolition to cases involving married or engaged couples, 
leaving the presumption intact in transfers from father and child.  
The Equality Act received Royal Assent on the 8th April 2010, and was one of the last 
pieces of legislation to be introduced by the outgoing Labour Government. However, that 
is not the end of the story.  
The Equality Act 2010 is a wide ranging statute which consolidates and extends protection 
from discrimination by aligning British legislation more closely with European Union law.22 
The majority of the provisions of Equality Act apply in England, Wales and Scotland, and 
                                                          
20
 Para 8, Explanatory Memorandum to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Northern Ireland) Order 
2005. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/nisi/2005/1452/memorandum/division/2. Accessed 21st 
January 2017. 
21
 The amendment was moved by Lord Lester of Herne Hill and agreed on 9 February 2010. 
22
 See Andrews, G; Gough, S; Nardone, M. (2010) ‘Promoting Equality and Learning in the Workplace’ [2010]    
I. J. D. O. C. N. Vol 10, 127. ISSN 1447-9532, for an overview of the provisions of the Equality Act 2010. 
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some provisions also apply in Northern Ireland.  The main provisions of the Act came into 
force in October 2010, but not all of the provisions were brought into effect at that time. 
Some of the provisions were phased in over time by the Coalition Government23, whilst 
others may not be brought into effect at all24.  
Section 199 is one of the sections of the Equality Act which is not yet in force in England 
and Wales. However, in 2010 the Northern Ireland Assembly passed a Legislative Consent 
Motion25 endorsing the abolition of the residual elements of the presumption of 
advancement through the Equality Act 2010. This followed consideration of a Briefing Note 
prepared by the Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Library Service26 which cited and 
endorsed the first author’s view, expressed in 200727 that the presumption of 
advancement discriminates between the sexes not only when it is applied to married or 
engaged couples, but also when applied to transactions involving parent and child.   
The Briefing Note also reinforced the contention that the presumption conflicts with 
Article 5, Protocol 7 and Article 1 Protocol 12 of the Convention, and picked up on the 
first author’s suggestion that an alternative to abolition is equalisation. ‘If the 
presumption of advancement applied to transfers from wives to husbands and mothers to 
children in the same way that it applies to transfers from husbands to wives and fathers to 
children, the effects of the presumption would be equalised and the discrimination would 
disappear. This would constitute an acceptable alternative to abolition, since the 
                                                          
23
 Provisions extending positive action on recruitment and selection are expected to be introduced in April 
2011.  
24
 The duty for public bodies to consider socio economic disadvantage when making strategic decisions will not 
be introduced by the current Coalition Government.  
25 Official Report (Hansard) Legislative Consent Motion – 13th January 2010 available at 
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/committees/2007-
2011/finance-and-personnel/minutes-of-evidence/session-2009-
2010/100113legislativeconsentmotion.pdf Accessed 3rd November 2017. 
26
 Briefing Note 03/10 available at 
http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/researchandlibrary/2010/0310.pdf Accessed 3rd November 
2017. 
27
 Andrews,G. (2007) ‘The Presumption of Advancement: Equity, Equality and Human Rights.’ [2007] 71 Conv 
398.  
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presumption of advancement is not offensive in itself. It is rather the discriminatory 
application of the presumption that contravenes Convention rights.’28 This approach was 
rejected in the briefing note solely on the grounds that ‘it would be at odds with the 2005 
order which abolished the presumption of advancement between married and engaged 
couples.’  
Section 199 of the Equality Act 2010 is therefore effective in Northern Ireland; however, it 
is not yet in force in the remainder of the United Kingdom. The wording of the section has 
provoked academic criticism29, and the Law Commission have indicated that recent case 
law developments require further consideration before the provisions are brought into 
effect. Even if it was brought into force, there is the issue that its wording could mean the 
presumption is only abolished in respect of gifts by husbands to their wives but not to 
other relationships to which the presumption applies. 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
Arguments calling for the abolition of the presumption of advancement are often based on 
the Convention. In particular, Article 5 of Seventh Protocol, which provides that: 
Spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of a private law character 
between them, and in their relations with their children, as to marriage and in the 
event of its dissolution. This article shall not prevent States from taking such measures 
as are necessary in the interests of children.  
If the presumption of advancement is regarded as ‘a right or responsibility of a private law 
character’ then there is a clear violation of this article. However, Glister argues that 
article is not engaged because the presumption is a rule of evidence and not a right or 
                                                          
28
 Andrews,G. (2007) ‘The Presumption of Advancement: Equity, Equality and Human Rights.’ [2007] 71 Conv 
398, at p 346. 
29
 Glister, J. ‘Section199 of the Equality Act 2010: How Not to Abolish the Presumption of Advancement.’ 
(2010) M.L.R. 73(5) 785-823. 
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responsibility.30 This is an interesting argument, but not one that is widely shared, since 
successive UK governments have felt unable to ratify the Seventh Protocol because of the 
perceived conflict with Article 5 of the Seventh Protocol. The authors contend that whilst 
the presumption of advancement may not be a right or a responsibility, it is not merely a 
rule of evidence that governs whether, when, how and for what purpose, proof of a legal 
case may be placed before a court for consideration. Rather it is a judicial presumption, 
which impacts on rights and responsibilities in a discriminatory manner. Hence there is a 
conflict with article 5.  
The result of the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union (EU) means that the UK 
Government is unlikely to ratify the Protocol, since government attention and 
parliamentary time will be monopolised by the process of exiting the EU. However, it is 
important to note that, at the time of writing, the UK is leaving the EU. It is not leaving 
the Convention. There was early speculation that the UK should repeal the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (the HRA) and withdraw from the Convention. Theresa May was going to 
campaign to leave the Convention as part of 2020 election campaign but that was before 
she called an early general election and she has now said the United Kingdom will remain 
signatories to the Convention until the end of the current Parliament. So, what would 
happen if the Protocol was ratified? Under Article 46 of the Convention the United 
Kingdom, as a signatory state, would be required in international law to bring section 199 
into force if the European Court of Human Rights held that the presumption violates 
Article 5. However, ratification, in itself, would not make Article 5 part of English 
domestic law (which is dualist in its approach to international law) as that would require it 
being added to the Articles and Procotols of the Convention that are listed in section 1(1) 
of, and Schedule 1 to, the Human Rights Act 1998 (the HRA). If that happened it would not 
mean that, for example, a husband could sue his wife for a violation of Article 5 because 
                                                          
30
 Glister J ‘Section 199 of the Equality Act 2010: How Not to Abolish the Presumption Advancement’ (2010) 73 
Mod L Rev 807 at 814.    
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the presumption does not apply against wives, as the wife, as a private citizen, is not a 
private authority. Likewise there is no statute to be interpreted for compatibility with 
Convention rights as required by section 3 of the HRA. However, Article 5 would be 
relevant because the UK courts are ‘public authorities’ (s 6(3) (a) HRA) and will develop 
domestic common law in a way that secures Convention rights. This is known as the 
indirect horizontal effect of the Convention, and would mean that a domestic court in a 
private law dispute between a husband and wife could equalise the presumption of 
advancement so that it applied against equally against husbands and wife, thus removing 
the direct discrimination against husbands and complying with Article 5.  
In a recent journal article, Blackham comments that ‘[w]hile extending the presumption 
would remedy any direct gender discrimination, it may lead to indirect discrimination 
against women. While the economic role and position of women has changed since the 
presumption was first applied, women continue to experience financial inequality and 
disadvantage in England’.31 This is an interesting argument, which leads to other 
questions. Is it equitable to retain direct discrimination that clearly disadvantages one 
gender, on the basis that remedying the direct discrimination may give rise to indirect 
discrimination against the other gender? Using a different analogy, if legislation existed 
that financially favoured women, but not men, would it be equitable to retain the 
legislation on the grounds that abolition might indirectly discriminate against women, who 
tend to earn less than their male counterparts? The equalisation of the UK state pension 
age, which previously allowed women to claim earlier than men, is one example of a 
situation where the UK Parliament appear to have acted contrary to this argument.  
It is also interesting to consider judicial argument in Hong Kong and Singapore concerning 
the presumption of advancement. The Hong Kong Court of Appeal has concluded that 
there is no basis for distinguishing between fathers and mothers in respect of the 
                                                          
31
 No 27 at 795. 
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presumption of advancement.32  The Singapore Court of Appeal has stated that the 
presumption still has a role to play in property and family law but the instances for the 
application of the presumption should not remain stagnant but rather have to change with 
time to reflect changing social attitudes.33  Thus there persuasive support from other 
common law jurisdictions for English domestic courts to equalise the presumption between 
spouses. 
Whilst equalisation of the presumption of advancement is possible in respect of spouses, 
even if the Seventh Protocol was ratified by the United Kingdom, and incorporated into 
domestic law, there remain the other arbitrary effects of the presumption as it does apply 
to gifts by a father to a legitimate child and by a man to his fiancée but does not apply to 
gifts involving a void marriage, or gifts between co-habiting couples, or a gift from a man 
to his mistress. This is the current state of English law and, as Blackham points out, ‘the 
presumption is discriminatory and is inconsistent with the spirit of the Equality Act 2010 
(UK) c 15 and the Equality Act 2006 (UK), which seek to eliminate all types of unlawful 
discrimination’.34 The discriminatory operation of the presumption also violates Article 1 
of the Twelfth Protocol to the Convention which provides for a general prohibition on 
discrimination. This Protocol has not been signed or ratified by the United Kingdom but if 
it was signed and ratified and added to the Human Rights Act, then the horizontal effect 
of the Convention would enable the courts to rule that the presumption applies in all 
these relationships thus equalising the law. The Supreme Court has showed a willingness 
to apply horizontal effect in respect of private law disputes where Parliament has been 
unwilling to intervene.35   
                                                          
32
 Suen Shu Tai v Tam Fung Tai [2014] HKEC 1125, CA. 
33
 Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence and another [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108; [2007] SGCA 54 
34
 No 27 at 789, 
35
 See PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26 for an example where horizontal effect of the 
Convention was applied. Contrast McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 where horizontal effect was not 
applied as Parliament had already intervened.    
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If the presumption is to be equalised by applying the horizontal effect of the Convention, 
how far should this equalisation go? The most obvious revision is to treat wives and 
mothers the same as fathers and husbands when the presumption is in operation. This 
would make the presumption gender neutral. But should the presumption apply to 
cohabitees and homosexual couples? This is a difficult question for our plural society and is 
really a matter for Parliament, which because of Brexit lacks the time to deal with these 
issues, so we must look to the courts for an answer.            
Conclusion. 
The Government is currently preoccupied with the legislative burden relating to the 
European Union Repeal Bill and beyond, so bringing into force section 199 is likely to be a 
very low priority. This does mean there is an anomaly, in that the presumption has been 
abolished in Northern Ireland but not the rest of the United Kingdom. This could lead to 
cases where there is a difficult conflict of laws. At the time of writing, neither the 
Seventh nor Twelfth Protocols to the Convention are part of domestic law, so the courts 
are unable to equalise the presumption by applying the horizontal effect of the 
Convention. However, despite this sorry situation the courts have made some moves to 
equalise the presumption by applying it to gifts made by mothers to their children.36  This 
is a step towards the view of the Law Commission that the presumption (if it is not to be 
abolished) should be gender neutral when it is applied.37 This would also mean that the 
application of the presumption would reflect the view of ordinary people that when 
parents make gifts to their children absolute ownership should pass. This is an argument 
for retaining the presumption of advancement. This would mean that the presumption is 
more in line with other common law jurisdictions such as that of Australia.38 But the 
question remains, who are ordinary people? Blackham argues that this revised presumption 
only helps the white middle class because it has the wealth to give away; in contrast 
                                                          
36
 Close Invoice Finance Ltd v Abaowa [2010] EWHC 1920. 
37
 Law Commission , The Illegality Defence,  Law Com No 320. 
38
 No 27 at 795 citing Brown v Brown (19930 31 NSWLR 582 at 591 and 600.  
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Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and black people have generally less wealth so a gender neutral 
presumption against parents may leave parents in poverty.39 For this reason the Supreme 
Court takes the view that the presumption is discriminatory and in its death throes, but 
unfortunately the court did not take the opportunity to abolish it, taking instead its usual 
approach of leaving it to Parliament to bring s199 into force ‘[t]he presumption of 
advancement is to receive its quietus when section 199 of the Equality Act 2010 is brought 
into force’.40 This is not going to happen anytime soon so we must rely on the courts to 
equalise the presumption in the rare cases where they cannot avoid it. The final issue is 
whether there should be an objective assessment of wealth so that the presumption is 
applied in both an equal and equitable way. This approach was disapproved by the High 
Court of Australia in Nelson v Nelson41(McHugh J):   
[that] would seriously undermine the operation of the presumption of advancement. It 
would allow it to operate only where the surrounding circumstances were consistent 
with the presumption. It would also substitute an inquiry into the circumstances of the 
case for the automatic operation of the rule, thus increasing the uncertainty of 
property titles and promoting litigation. As long as the presumption of advancement 
continues to apply to property dealings, it should apply whenever the parties stand in a 
relationship that has been held to give rise to the presumption. The circumstances 
surrounding a relationship may be used to rebut the presumption, but they cannot be 
used to prevent it from arising.42 
Pace McHugh J it is submitted that this undermining of the presumption of advancement is 
just what English courts should do.  Otherwise there is a risk of the presumption becoming 
more unequal and unequitable because it could be applied against individuals that, 
because of their status, will be left in poverty as a result of its operation. It should 
                                                          
39
 No 27 at 797. 
40
 Jones v Kernot [2011] UKSC 53 at [24]. 
41
 (1995) 184 CLR 538. No 27 at 798. 
42
 Ibid at 604. 
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operate only where the surrounding circumstances were consistent with the presumption, 
otherwise it will operate to assume there is an even distribution of wealth in our society.   
 
 
        
 
